ZeroHour

Security

Who could leak a paper, and what stops them. Each row says whether the protection runs on testnet today or is next on the roadmap.

Threat model

If…What happensStatus
Someone at the press, in transport or in a strongroom copies the paperThey only ever hold ciphertext. The readable paper does not exist until the bell.Live
A centre tries to open earlyIts key opens only its own envelope, and the time half is missing until 2 keypers post. recordOpening reverts with NotUnlocked.Live
One keyper leaks its seed earlyOne seed opens nothing. Whoever holds the early seed can commit-reveal it and take half that keyper's bond. This happened on testnet: a bribed keyper was slashed 14 minutes before its exam opened (see the release ledger).Live
Keypers colludeThey need the threshold of seeds before the bell, and each accomplice can betray the rest for half a bond. Cost grows with threshold and bond (calculator below).Live
A keyper is offline at the bellAny threshold of keypers opens it. If the paper itself is compromised, the board switches every centre to a backup paper sealed to a later round.Live
A centre leaks after openingEvery centre's paper is a different permutation. A few questions from a photo name the centre; the Leak Hunter files a signed report.Live
Someone swaps a ciphertext fileEach centre's ciphertext hash is on chain before the exam. The console refuses a file that does not match.Live
The board seals to an attacker's keyCentre keys are read only from QoreChain's KEM registry and bound to the account by a hybrid-signed recipient card.Live
A quantum attacker records everything todayEvery lock and signature is post-quantum: ML-KEM-1024, QoreSeal hybrid, ML-DSA-87.Live
The RPC operator sees a seed in an eth_callKeyper daemons never let a seed leave the machine before chain time passes the round, not even for gas estimation.Live
A keyper's ECDSA key is stolenIts EVM window is scoped to the Hourglass registry and needs an ML-DSA-87 signature to open. We hand our drill key to the attacker bot on purpose.Live
The exam board itself leaks the paperThe board writes the paper, so ZeroHour cannot hide it from the board. The fairness reveal proves no centre got a different paper. Splitting authorship across setters is next.Next

Cost of corruption

Opening a paper early means getting a threshold of keypers to break their one rule, while each of them can be paid to betray the others.

Keypers in the exam: 3
Seeds needed to open (threshold): 2
Bond per keyper: 1 QOR
2 QOR

at risk to open one paper early, across 2 people who each gain half a bond by turning the others in.

Today's testnet exams run 2 of 3 keypers at 1 QOR each. The contract allows any threshold and bond: a national exam would set both far higher and draw keypers from different institutions.

What is real today

PieceStatus
HourglassRegistry and ZeroHourExam on QoreChain testnetLive on testnet
Three bonded keypers with ML-KEM-1024 round keys and daemonsLive on testnet
Two centres with on-chain KEM keys and signed recipient cardsLive on testnet
In-browser opening with ciphertext, seed and anchor checksLive on testnet
Leak tracing against 1,000 variants (2 real centres, 998 simulated) and signed on-chain reportsLive on testnet
Public fairness reveal, recomputed in the browserLive on testnet
Leak Hunter reading a real phone photo with Claude visionNext
Outside keypers from other institutionsNext
Multi-setter sealing so no single person holds the paperNext
Least-privilege hot key for keypersNext